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The move to ‘resilience’ language in local security planning has created innovative possibilities 
for governing communities in the UK through an emphasis on local, voluntary participation. 
After the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act, the term ‘resilience’ has come to define the UK’s 
approach to securing British lives and infrastructure from both natural and man-made threats 
(Lentzos and Rose, 2009; Coaffee and Rogers, 2008). The government’s ‘Community Resilience 
Programme’, the final phase of which was rolled out by the UK Cabinet Office from March 
2011, sought to make this pre-emptive security the responsibility of community groups. Rather 
than coping with major terrorist attacks or viral outbreaks, this programme focused on bouncing 
back from more prosaic emergencies such as flooding. I argue that through this agenda, 
resilience has become an important tactic not only in governing, managing and controlling 
communities, but in seeking to produce them in the first place. Following Michel Foucault, I 
understand ‘government’ to mean all the diverse ways in which individuals, organisations and 
groups throughout society direct, change and control the actions and behaviours of themselves 
and others (see Foucault 2002, 341; also 2004; 2007). As Colin Gordon (1991, 2-3) has noted 
such governmentality can be used in ‘both a wide and a narrow sense’; I use it in an inclusive way 
to mean the use of different types of power (sovereign, disciplinary, pastoral, and so on) by a 
range of actors ‘to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons’.  We can see 
this in the stated aim of the community resilience programme as producing ‘cultural and 
behavioural change across the country’ (Cabinet Office [CO] 2011a: 15). The programme thus 
aims to be creative but also to diffuse techniques and tactics of government through a discourse 
of community empowerment.  
 
The first section of the article draws out these processes through a critical reading of the key 
products the Cabinet Office has prepared, especially its ‘Strategic National Framework on 
Community Resilience’ (CO 2011a), the ‘Guide for Communities’ (CO 2011b), the ‘Toolkit’ (CO 
2011c) and ‘Template’ (CO 2011d) for resilience planning. In offering this reading I aim to make 
a limited intervention in a specific programme and its understanding of resilience. The Cabinet 
Office’s materials were chosen because they are a discrete example of this government 
department’s role as the key coordinator and interpreter of the resilience discourse with regard to 
communities. As such, the argument I make cannot necessarily be generalised across UK 
resilience programmes. These texts and policy frameworks are read as what Roxanne Lyn Doty 
(1993, 302) calls ‘discursive practices’, intertextual constructions which work to fix the meaning 
of concepts such as ‘resilience’ and ‘community’. These Cabinet Office materials are not 
commands or inventions of central government but governmentalizing intertexts: the product of 
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three years (2008-2011) of consultation and ‘learning from those already engaged in community 
resilience activities’ (CO 2011a, 15). Reading them as discursive practices means paying attention 
to the way the community resilience programme exercises power to ‘create various kinds of 
subjects and simultaneously position these subjects vis-á-vis one another’ (Doty 1993, 303) in 
relations of hierarchy, responsibility, subordination and marginalisation. My reading aims to draw 
out these productive power relations, revealing them as contestable and problematic. The 
interpretation I offer is itself contingent and disputable, but it operates within a certain 
understanding of ‘advanced liberal’ techniques of government (see, for example, Dillon and Reid 
2001; Miller and Rose 2008; Rose 2000a). The second section then suggests two problems with 
this use of community resilience in its highly selective understanding of the term, ignoring the 
apparent centrality of poverty and equality to resilience, as well as the violence inherent in 
community. Though the resistance of government is not the focus of this article, both of these 
problems illustrate the fact way that the community resilience agenda will inevitably be countered 
by those managed through it. Nonetheless, it may well be that the framework is more successful 
as a tactic of government than as a way of ensuring communities’ adaptation following disasters. 
 
 
PRODUCING AND GOVERNING COMMUNITIES 
 
Ostensibly resilience is unrelated to government and governing. According to the UK Cabinet 
Office (2011a, 4), resilience is a capacity which enables a system to ‘adapt in order to sustain an 
acceptable level of function, structure and identity’ (definition taken from Edwards, 2009). 
Resilience is thus not about prevention but accepting that, as the ‘Guide’ puts it: ‘Emergencies 
happen’ (CO 2011b, 2). It involves accepting that disasters are inevitable, and the best that can 
be done is to ‘bounce back’ by adapting to the new circumstances. This understanding of 
‘resilience’ is both questionable and has developed from contestable premises (see Walker and 
Cooper 2011). But my concern is with how resilience is being used in this particular context and 
more specifically what it aims to produce. A definition of specifically community resilience is 
offered by the Cabinet Office as the abilities of local people and groups to harness ‘local 
resources and expertise to help themselves in an emergency’ (2011a, 4). What distinguishes 
community resilience in this material therefore is that the assignment of a subject of resilience 
includes a transfer of agency and responsibility. Organising the immediate response to, and 
recovery from a disaster, traditionally the role of central and local government, is shifted to local 
individuals, groups and agencies. To claim that this programme outlines the production and 
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government of community (through) resilience is counterintuitive: government appears to 
withdraw itself in this agenda; communities are presupposed rather than created. 
 
We can, however, see the productive aspect in the first step towards resilience recommended by 
both the ‘Guide’ and the ‘Toolkit’: to set about ‘identifying your community’ (CO 2011c, 3). One 
should start the whole process by ‘considering who your community is and which communities 
you belong to’ (CO 2011b, 9; 2011c, 3). Thus while the agenda is very much based upon the 
assumption of pre-existing communities – and we are explicitly warned that this is ‘not about 
creating or identifying a whole new community network’ (CO 2011b, 8) – its initial concern is 
nonetheless precisely such creation. In other words, its first aim is to generate affective ties, a 
sense of ‘belonging’ – what I am calling the production of community. After all, one’s 
community cannot be straightforward or obvious if one has to ponder its identity or existence, 
while the first step to its resilience is establishing the idea of belonging which appears to be its 
hallmark. Of course, such a production will inevitably interact, reinforce and at times conflict 
with other community building/generating policies and programmes, both from government and 
beyond (see Office for Civil Society 2010).  
 
On the one hand, the ‘Framework’ especially demonstrates a praise-worthy awareness of the 
complexity of community, noting several different ‘types’, from geographical, to communities of 
‘interest’, ‘circumstance’ and ‘supporters’ (CO 2011a, 11-12). While all the documents note that 
community involves ‘people linked by a common bond’, geographical communities are held to 
be the ‘obvious choice for, and primary beneficiary of, community resilience’ (CO 2011a, 12; 
2011b, 9). While on the one hand commendable, on the other this discussion betrays a lack of 
certainty and assurance about precisely what community is. Officially sanctioned community 
resilience guidance and assessments in other countries displays no such hesitation. For instance, 
an Australian response to a series of disasters in Victoria in the late 1990s, which sought to assess 
and make recommendations on personal and communal resilience and vulnerability, 
acknowledged the complexity of community but treated it as self-evidently a geographically 
defined social aggregation or network of individuals and groups (see Buckle, Marsh and Smale 
2001, 12; 34). Some manuals on community resilience contain almost no discussion of 
‘community’, while others identify it simply by geographical area.1 All appear sure they know 
                                                 
1 For example, see Gurwitch et al.’s (2007) Oklahoma focused, Building Community Resilience for Children and Families 
guidelines and the British Columbian Centre for Community Enterprise (CCE 2000) Community Resilience Manual. 
These guides and assessments differ greatly, with one (Australian) focusing on fires and floods, one on the 
infrastructural, psychological and social recovery from terrorist attacks and natural disasters (Oklahoman) and one 
on the economic sustainability of rural communities under conditions of globalisation (British Columbian). They are 
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what it is. What is interesting in the UK approach is that community construction – creating 
belonging – rather than its perpetuation appears the purpose of resilience. Thus, though disaster 
management literature acknowledges that community development unconnected to risk and 
threat automatically increases a community’s resilience (for a discussion, see Paton and Johnston 
2001, 274), the UK guidelines reverse the relation: building resilience becomes a way of 
constructing community. 
 
Of course, the processes of production and government of communities cannot be fully 
separated and is not necessarily a top-down process. It is continually stressed that central 
government’s role is one of ‘motivating’ and ‘incentivising’ (CO 2011a, 6), ‘supporting’ and 
‘enabling’ communities to help themselves (Ibid, 7), ‘inviting’ rather than demanding participation 
(Ibid, 9), and ‘sharing good practice’ (Ibid, 13). Rather, creating communities through resilience 
also produces the subjects and hierarchies through which power will be exercised. It is noted that 
the second step towards community resilience in the ‘Guide’ and ‘Toolkit’ is the identification of 
local relationships, networks and people who can become involved in resilience (CO 2011b, 9; 
2011c, 3), while the third and fourth involve establishing a ‘community representative’ to take 
charge of the emergency plan (CO 2011b, 10), along with coordinators and a ‘Community 
Emergency Group’ (CO 2011c, 4). The programme ultimately suggests a hierarchical positioning 
of different subjects: resilience ‘champions’, ‘experts’, ‘volunteers’, ‘resilient individuals’ and, at 
the bottom, the ‘vulnerable’.  
 
The separation and relation between such identities is part of producing a community that can 
more easily be governed and govern itself. At the top of this hierarchy is the ‘community 
representative’, or community resilience ‘champion’ for the ‘Framework’ (CO 2011a, 15).2 This 
individual must be someone who is trusted and has a coordinating, organisational and 
cheerleading role (with the ‘energy and enthusiasm’ to get others involved and keep them 
involved) (CO 2011a, 15). Thus they can be read as disciplining the other identities by 
controlling the ethos and values of the community. In a role that appears semi-detached from 
the hierarchy we then have the ‘experts’ of government agencies (such as the Environment 
Agency) and emergency services. They are not strictly part of the community but are there to 
                                                                                                                                                        
therefore only broadly comparable, but demonstrate how widely and for what differing purposes the term resilience 
is being used. 
2 Their position at the top of a hierarchy is given diagrammatic representation in the ‘sample telephone tree’ offered 
in the ‘Template’ for a Community Emergency Plan (CO 2011d, 8). 
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encourage and offer advice, yet without any statutory responsibility to help local groups (CO 
2011a, 14-15). 
 
A more central figure for the constitution of community as well as its resilience and government 
is the figure of the ‘volunteer’. It is stressed throughout that participation in the community 
resilience programme must be without compulsion or coercion, as it merely aims to ‘set out the 
possible benefits’ of resilience (CO 2011a, 5). This is a key aspect of the shift to governmentality, 
where power operates through freedom and empowerment rather than force or diktat (Foucault 
2007, 46-47). Nonetheless volunteers are absolutely necessary: they do the footwork of resilience 
planning and action. While it is ‘often spontaneous’, volunteering clearly requires management, 
advice on which appears in the ‘Toolkit’ (CO 2011c, 7). Together the resilience ‘champion’ and 
‘volunteers’ form a kind of idealised ‘resilient individual’, a collection of which make up a 
resilient community (CO 2011a, 15). The resilient individual has ‘taken steps to make their 
homes and families more resilient… are aware of their skills, experience and resources and how 
to deploy these to best effect during emergencies’. They are ‘actively involved in influencing and 
making decisions affecting them’ and ‘take an interest in their environment and act in the interest 
of the community to protect assets and facilities’ (CO 2011a, 15). This is what the programme 
aims to produce – individuals who have internalised the norms of community and resilience to 
manage and conduct the behaviour and actions of themselves and their community more 
efficiently and effectively. 
 
The final figure, at the base of this governmental hierarchy, is that from whom no such resilience 
can be expected: the ‘vulnerable’. While it is acknowledged that ‘Emergencies can make anyone 
vulnerable’ (CO 2011c, 4), some are clearly more so than others and will require extra help from 
volunteers and champions. Those explicitly identified as ‘vulnerable’ are those who have recently 
had an operation, the old, those without transport, with limited mobility, transient groups and 
those who might find emergency information difficult to understand (CO 2011c, 6). This subject 
is one that is lacking something, thus expectations of normal (resilient) behaviour do not apply – 
rather, they are used to orient and direct the behaviour of the normal. Vulnerability also 
demonstrates the way in which resilience is being used to both govern and produce the community 
through the stress placed upon knowing and producing knowledge about it. A key aspect of the 
‘Toolkit’ is ‘collecting information’, especially about who is vulnerable: ‘This requires local 
knowledge and your help’ (CO 2011c, 4). The ‘Template’ offered for a Community Emergency 
Plan contains a section to list organisations that may be helpful in identifying the vulnerable (CO 
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2011d, 9). Local skills and resources are continually assessed, as are potential risks and locations 
of ‘safety’ (CO 2011d, 4-6). This mundane gathering and disseminating of information is an 
important way in which a community is made knowable, visible, calculable and thus more easily 
regulated (Inda 2006, 6). 
 
Though aimed at times of crisis and emergency, this mentality of government, or ‘conduct of 
conduct’ (Gordon 1991, 2), happens continuously and in perpetuity. Resilience is about 
preparation ‘in advance of an emergency actually happening’ (CO 2011a, 7). Thus a range of 
further tactics beyond the production and positioning of subjects are put into operation, such as 
the use of drills and mock emergencies: ‘practice activating the plan to test how well it would 
work’ and ‘allow you to identify any problems’ (CO 2011c, 12). A more developed tactic is the 
targeting of children (often included in categories of the vulnerable) in success stories such as the 
‘Developing Community Resilience Through Schools’ project, led by Essex and 
Nottinghamshire County Councils (see CO 2011c, 23; the project’s website is 
http://schoolemergencies.info/). This project involves the inclusion of resilience teaching using 
role play and ‘fun activities’ throughout the curriculum of 6-11 year olds (see CO 2011e, 1). 
Volunteers are not compelled; children, in contrast, have no choice over their participation. A 
range of exercises and materials have been produced as part of this project, a rather disturbing 
example of which is the ‘What if…?’ website (www.whatif-guidancce.org). Here games, books, 
DVDs, jigsaws and calendars are used to teach children the inevitability of emergencies, death 
and destruction as well as preparations such as what to put in a ‘grab box’. The project appears 
to be a real success story, and statistics are used to back this up: 79% of children ‘enjoyed the 
online “Ben and Molly” emergency learning games’, while 64% have made a fire escape plan for 
their homes (CO 2011e, 2).  
 
Through a variety of techniques then, the Community Resilience agenda targets the production 
and government of community. Key to the agenda is the way resilient individuals are advised to 
firstly consider who their community is, actively creating it through the steps they then take to 
resilience. Gathering knowledge, for instance, constitutes community as an object and subject, as 
well as being part of its management. The categorisation and hierarchical placing of subjects 
allows for more efficient direction of conduct, as do drills and rehearsals of emergency plans. In 
this way, every resilient individual governs themselves and others. Most interestingly perhaps, 
59% of children ‘involved their families in the [Developing Community Resilience through 
Schools] project’ (CO 2011e, 2), demonstrating the way that children are now able to exercise a 
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circumscribed power, directing the behaviour of their families and communities towards 
resilience. Judging the programme’s success in directing behavour is beyond the scope of this 
article. While the Cabinet Office offers a ‘case study library’ (see: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/community-resilience-case-study-library), clear 
causal relations cannot be firmly established. What we can say is that this programme’s 
implementation, as with any operation of power, will inevitably be redirected, resisted and 
countered (Foucault 2007, 196.  But what are the problems and inconsistencies of this approach 
from which counter-conducts may arise? And what is at stake here? 
 
 
SELECTIVE RESILIENCE? POVERTY AND VIOLENCE 
 
The UK’s Community Resilience programme certainly represents an innovative attempt to bring 
emergency services and experts together with local volunteers and groups in the creation and 
management of safer, more adaptable locales. As part of the coalition government’s wider ‘Big 
Society’ agenda (CO 2011a, 17; 22), the aim is thus for individuals and communities to take more 
responsibility for themselves, their own safety and security (Cameron, 2011; for more on the link 
to the Big Society, see Bulley and Sokhi-Bulley, forthcoming). In this section I seek to interrogate 
and disturb the key aspects of this programme: its ignorance of poverty and inequality as 
hallmarks of vulnerability and its treatment of community as an unproblematic ‘good’. 
 
Poverty and Inequality 
As noted above, part of the way community is created and governed through resilience is the 
hierarchical placing of the resilient individual above the vulnerable individual. The vulnerable are 
incapable of resilience, relying on the knowledge and organisation of champions and volunteers. 
But this conception of vulnerability, that which lacks resilience, is both limited and limiting. It is 
limited to the aged, the ill, the immobile, the non-English speaking and the transient. However, 
for much of the wider literature regarding emergency and disaster management, vulnerability is in 
large part the ‘product of social inequalities – those social factors that influence the susceptibility 
of various groups to harm and that also govern their ability to respond’ (Cutter et al. 2003, 243). 
These include gender, racial and socio-economic inequalities, though the latter tends to be 
emphasized because the poor cannot as easily rebuild, relocate, or replace lost food, and goods 
(Coles and Buckle 2004, 98). The most important indicator explaining or predicting vulnerability 
within a community, then, is ‘socio-economic status’, defined as ‘income, political power and 
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prestige’ and measured by per capita income (Cutter et al. 2003, 245 and 251). A great number of 
other factors feed into this notion of vulnerability (including occupation and education), but all 
other aspects are heightened when someone is poor (Yarnal 2007, 250-251). The poor simply 
have the fewest resources to cope with disasters (Maguire and Hagan 2007, 17; Paton and 
Johnston 2001, 272); as Godschalk (2003, 140) puts it, their lives ‘are the most constrained’. 
Equally, the most resilient communities have the greatest ‘resource equity’ and are most likely to 
see each member helping others out in emergencies (Norris et al. 2008, 137). 
 
We can see the interaction of race and socio-economic inequality in studies of the vulnerability 
and resilience of individuals and communities in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
Before and during the crisis those in the poorer (and generally ‘blacker’) areas had more to fear 
from looters, but less access to information, evacuation plans, transportation and found it harder 
to fund their family’s evacuation (Yarnal 2007, 251-252). But the ability to ‘bounce back’, to 
adapt in order to sustain levels of function – the very definition of resilience for the UK Cabinet 
Office – was also far more difficult for the poor and black. To bounce back one needs a job, but 
in New Orleans working class blacks where seven times more likely to have lost their job after 
Katrina than the average white worker (Elliott and Pais 2006, 317). Not only were poverty and 
inequality problems which severely hampered the city’s resilience (see official study by Colten et 
al. 2008, 25), by not focusing policy on raising standards of living and equality in the aftermath 
greater resilience will remain elusive (Walker and Cooper, 2011: 154). 
 
In the end, it is likely that the most vulnerable people of New Orleans will be the last to 
recover, will have the least capacity to adapt and to reduce their future exposure and 
sensitivity, and therefore will continue to be the most vulnerable. Those people are 
mostly black and almost all poor. Is it enough to “put right again” an inequitable system 
that maintains classic differences in vulnerability, or are there ways we can use recovery 
to improve both the physical and human systems to reduce vulnerability overall and, in 
particular, in the most vulnerable parts of the system? (Yarnal 2007, 253) 
 
Recognising poverty and inequality as the number one source of community vulnerability and 
lack of resilience illustrates what is at stake in the UK’s programme and confirms Walker and 
Cooper’s (2011, 145) claims of a close proximity between emergent discourses of resilience and 
contemporary neoliberalism. Why are poverty and inequality entirely absent from the community 
resilience agenda? Because this would require local and central government spending and policies 
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targeting ‘equity in hazard vulnerability, focusing on poorer areas’ of the community (Godschalk 
2003, 141). But being part of the coalition’s ‘Big Society’, which follows on from New Labour’s 
‘Third Way’, the aim of the agenda is rather to make local people themselves responsible for 
their own resilience. This is a ‘double movement of autonomization and responsibilization’ 
where communities and individuals are granted freedom within certain limits, but made morally 
and financially responsible for their own success and failure (Rose 2000a, 1400). Pelling thus 
asks: ‘Why should the vulnerable, many of whom have to expend their resources, time and 
energy just getting by, be expected to plan for future uncertainties and risk? For many individuals 
and households this is a non-question – they simply cannot’ (Pelling 2003, 164). Such non-
compliance becomes an inevitable and inescapable form of failure for, and resistance to, the 
programme. This is not to patronise the poor or treat them as objects without agency (Chandler 
2012). Rather it is to suggest that the possibility and futurity of floods and pandemics cannot rate 
high on a priority list in relation to immediate economic concerns of the most poor. The 
communal solidarity of the Community Resilience agenda therefore works less to generate 
conditions for ‘bouncing back’ from disaster and more to manage expectations and behaviour in 
a neoliberal political economy of government which aims ‘at accomplishing more through a 
lesser exertion of force and authority’ (Gordon 1991, 24) by ‘governing at a distance’ (Rose 
2000b, 48-9). 
 
Violence and Community 
The second aspect of the programme that I wish to trouble is the treatment of community as a 
benign and unproblematic ‘good’. While exhibiting a lack of assurance about what community is, 
it appears as benevolent and nonthreatening. It is a good to be developed, retained and 
resurrected after an emergency. This relies upon an outdated, romantic, united and ‘unitary’ 
conception of community (Edwards 1997, 831). We have already noted the existence of racial 
and socio-economic divisions and their effects on resilience/vulnerability. But the programme’s 
rosy representation is arguably only possible because, while it claims to be for the UK (CO 
2011a, 5), a key area of the UK is ignored: Northern Ireland.3 Here, community is often tied up 
with division and violence. In Belfast particularly, community cannot be defined by geographical 
area because of the prominence of ‘interface’ areas, where Catholics and Protestants particularly 
in the North and West of the city live in close proximity. Between 1969 and 2004, over 84% of 
politically motivated killings took place under a kilometre from such an interface (Shirlow and 
                                                 
3 The ‘scope’ of the programme is later restricted to England and Wales, with mention of Scotland but none of 
Northern Ireland (CO 2011a, 13) 
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Murtagh 2006, 73). This violence is still brought into intense relief each year by the 12 July 
marches.  
 
Yet, it is important to note that even in largely homogenous vicinities such as the Catholic 
Ardoyne area of North Belfast, intercommunity rivalry has detracted attention from 
‘intracommunity divisions and tensions’ (Shirlow and Murtagh 2004, 61). The potential for threat 
and violence coming from within the community then can never be understated, with 1,129 
punishment attacks taking place despite paramilitary ceasefires from 1994-2004 (Shirlow and 
Murtagh 2006, 52). Mundane tensions and divisions are more common. These can run along the 
lines of parish boundaries, micro-neighbourhoods or the nature of in-migration for the past 150 
years (Shirlow and Murtagh 2004, 62). And while the emphasis for motivating others and 
forming communal bonds in the Community Resilience programme is placed on community 
leaders (‘champions’ and ‘coordinators’) these figures are often viewed with suspicion in the 
Ardoyne, seen as remote and hierarchical (Ibid., 62). I am not trying to contradict the idea of 
community as a ‘good’ by arguing that in Belfast it is experienced as the opposite. Indeed, this is 
far from the case. I merely point out that community can just as easily be a space of threat and 
violence as benign collaboration.  
 
It could be argued that Northern Ireland is a special case in this regard. But in fact, it is far less 
exceptional than it appears. In research and case studies on resilience Pelling (2003, 177) found 
that communities always show signs of heterogeneity and competition as well as cooperation.  
Even the type of idyll the programme seems to rely upon is riven with power relations and 
disunity. As Delanty (2010, 28) notes, one of the first anthropological studies of a fairly 
homogenous rural community in Wales (Frankenberg’s 1957, Village on the Border) ‘emphasized 
conflict and social divisions around class, gender and ethnicity as a feature of the life of the 
community’. Certainly we can say that ‘community’, whatever it is, will always include that within 
it which resists being contained and put to work for a unitary purpose (see Nancy 1991). Of 
course, feminists have long shown that power and violence are inherent in apparently ‘safe’ 
places such as the home and community. Sara Ahmed goes further, arguing that a type of 
structural violence is foundational to the possibility of community. She explores ‘Stranger 
Danger’ campaigns and ‘Neighbourhood Watch’ schemes, themselves an early type of small-scale 
community resilience through accepting responsibility for a particular locale.  
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The projection of danger onto the figure of the stranger allows violence to be figured as 
exceptional and extraordinary – as coming from outside the protective walls of the home, 
family, community or nation. As a result, the discourse of stranger danger involves a 
refusal to recognise how violence is structured by, and legitimated through, the formation of home and 
community as such. (Ahmed 2000, 36)  
 
Community is structurally produced through the figure of the stranger being violently excluded. 
It thus relies upon exclusion, suspicion and the creation of danger. But the issue of the stranger 
brings us full circle then, back to the creation of community. Part of the reason that the 
Community Resilience programme fails to be compelling is perhaps that it lacks such a stranger 
as threat. Rather, most often in the programme’s material the danger appears impersonal, 
especially in the shape of extreme weather conditions: all except one of the ‘case-studies’ of good 
practice in the ‘Guide’ (CO 2011b) refer to flooding disasters. This ignorance of the violence 
within communities and the lack of a ‘stranger’ figure puts the Community Resilience 
programme in the awkward position of pursuing two options: firstly it seeks to generate fear of 
impersonal forces in children and adults through the use of information campaigns and public 
education like the ‘What if…?’ website (www.whatif-guidance.org); and secondly, it actively 
requires and needs disasters and emergencies to occur in order to generate the necessary 
motivation for volunteering and participation. Thus, in an ironic twist, the ability to produce and 
govern community (through) resilience ends up necessitating the disastrous circumstances it 
ostensibly secures against. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Resilience is a term that has been used in a great variety of ways across a range of disciplines 
(Walker and Cooper, 2011). Calls for greater consensus have been heard especially from the 
disaster management arena (see Manyena, 2006). Additionally, the subject of resilience (what is it 
that is to be resilient) has been heterogeneously defined. While security literature appears to have 
focused on cities (see Coaffee, 2009; Coaffee et al., 2009; Godschalk, 2003; Pelling, 2003; Vale 
and Campanella, 2005), interest has spread to the resilience of non-urban communities 
(Chandler, 2012). Similarly, while social psychology has tended to focus on individuals and 
families, demonstrating ‘very little knowledge regarding community resilience’ (Kimhi and 
Shamai, 2004: 441), this concentration has also developed (for an introduction to this literature 
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see Norris et al. 2008). In official reports, policies and assessments, community resilience is also 
being used in diverse ways across the US (Gurwitch et al. 2007; Colten et al. 2008), Canada 
(Centre for Community Enterprise 2000) and Australia (Buckle et al 2001). This generates a large 
interdisciplinary literature which appears to have been only selectively consulted by the UK’s 
agenda. 
  
What is distinctive about the UK Community Resilience programme, from its initial phase of 
‘learning’ from community groups in November 2008, through the formation of a range of 
materials, to consultation and assessment in late 2011? I have argued that this approach is 
fundamentally about producing and governing community behaviour through the development 
of resilience. The passing over of responsibility to local volunteers, ‘champions’ and 
organisations is not about empowerment per se, but forming subjects, placing them in a hierarchy, 
drilling (and scaring) them into more manageable, directable (and resilient) individuals and 
communities. This is about spreading a mentality of government throughout society, channelling 
and guiding behaviour ‘at a distance’ (Rose 2000b, 48-9). While highly tuned, I suggested that 
this attempt was hamstrung by the romantic view of community on which it is based, as well as 
by the necessity of the emergencies it seeks to counter. 
 
But to what end is this behaviour change oriented? What is at stake here? I suggest that the 
ignorance of poverty and inequality as a (if not the) major cause of vulnerability and lack of 
resilience within communities gives us a clue. If what is at stake is communal solidarity and self-
help to enable adaptation to a range of disasters then poverty and inequality reduction would be 
an obvious and necessary target of policy and local action. But effacing this issue suggests that 
what is at stake is the creation of communally oriented, productive individuals and locales which 
can efficiently return to work after a catastrophe and minimise economic loss. This is then a 
communal solidarity directed towards coping with disasters. But it is also directed to communal 
survival under, rather than challenging of, what Miller and Rose (2008, 88) call ‘advanced liberal’ 
forms of government bolstered by the current economics and politics of austerity.  
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